

















Resumo		Os	 sistemas	 letais	 de	 armas	 autônomas	 tornaram-se	 icônes	 dos	 conflitos	contemporâneos.	Seu	impacto,	no	entanto,	não	se	limita	à	transformação	da	guerra	 e	 à	 evolução	 das	 tecnologias	militares.	 Pelo	 contrário,	 é	 necessário	examinar	 como	 os	 drones	 e	 robôs	militares	mudarão	 o	 quadro	 jurídico	 de	referência.	Mais	 especificamente,	 os	 juristas	 precisam	 refletir	mais	 sobre	 o	destino	 do	 Direito	 Internacional	 Humanitário,	 uma	 vez	 que	 a	 guerra	terminou	assumindo	um	caráter	pós-humano.	
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Abstract	Lethal	 Autonomous	 Weapons	 Systems	 have	 become	 iconic	 of	contemporary	 conflicts.	 Their	 impact,	 however,	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 the	transformation	of	warfare	and	the	evolution	of	military	technologies.	Rather,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 scrutinize	 how	drones	 and	military	 robots	will	 change	 the	 reference	 legal	 framework.	 More	 in	 particular	 legal	scholars	 need	 to	 reflect	 further	 on	 the	 fate	 of	 International	Humanitarian	Law	once	warfare	has	taken	a	posthuman	character.	
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Introduction:	A	‘drone’	military	revolution		 It	is	not	my	intention	to	reflect	on	the	legality	of	the	military	use	of	drones.	The	question	as	to	whether	these	weapons	systems	are	consistent	with	humanitarian	law	is	undoubtedly	a	subject	of	controversy:	 indeed,	practices	such	as	targeted	killing,	 largely	facilitated	by	drone	technology,	 risk	 compromising	 a	 ius	 belli	 that	 is	 axiologically	 founded	 on	 the	 limitation	 of	violence.	 As	 is	 well	 known,	 International	 Humanitarian	 Law	 (IHL)	 –	 starting	 from	 the	twentieth-century	 conventions	 and,	 even	 earlier,	 from	 the	 Saint	 Petersburg	 Declaration	 of	1868	 and	 the	 generous	 efforts	 of	 jurists	 belonging	 to	 the	 Institut	 de	 Droit	 International	(Mannoni,	 1999,	 pp.	 141-198)	 –has	 devoted	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 attention	 to	 prisoner-of-war	status,	providing	 that	 the	use	of	 lethal	 force	must	be	subordinate	 to	a	principle	of	necessity	and	 that	 enemy	 combatants	 should	 be	 guaranteed	 the	 option	 of	 surrendering	 (Redse	Johansen,	 2019)	 2.	 More	 recently,	 the	 International	 Committee	 of	 the	 Red	 Cross	 (ICRC)	stressed	that	it	“would	defy	basic	notions	of	humanity	to	kill	an	adversary	or	to	refrain	from	giving	him	or	her	an	opportunity	to	surrender	where	there	manifestly	is	no	necessity	for	the	use	 of	 lethal	 force.”3	 Lethal	 autonomous	 weapons	 (LAWs),	 however,	 risk	 destroying	 these	guarantees	by	giving	rise	to	an	indiscriminate	and	unlimited	use	of	lethal	force.	On	the	other	hand,	when	we	ask	ourselves	about	the	conformity	of	drone	technology	with	the	current	legal	order,	we	have	to	confront	a	thorny	issue:	the	legitimacy	of	the	use	of	armed	drones	 depends,	 in	 fact,	 on	 the	 paradigm	 adopted,	 i.e.	whether	 they	 have	 been	 used	 in	 the	context	of	an	 international	armed	conflict	or,	 rather,	an	non-international	armed	conflict,	or	else	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 law	 enforcement	 operation	 conducted	 outside	 national	 territory	(Meloni,	2013;	Brookman-Byrne,	2017;	Hajjar,	2019).	The	fact	that,	in	a	fluid	and	asymmetric	international	situation	such	as	today’s,	the	qualification	of	their	specific	use	is	essentially	the	result	of	a	political	choice	ends	up	making	every	assessment	contingent	and	partial	to	say	in	the	least	(Zolo,	2000;	Zolo,	2015).		The	 starting	 point	 I	 intend	 to	 adopt	 is	 another,	 however:	 rather	 than	 focusing	 on	 the	question	of	the	legitimacy	of	using	LAWs,	I	am	interested	in	reflecting	on	how	such	weapons	systems	 end	 up	 influencing	 the	 reference	 legal	 framework	 and,	 more	 generally,	 the	 very	notion	of	warfare.	The	basic	argument	 is	 that	 the	reliance	on	autonomous	weapons	systems	has	 triggered	 a	 shift	 in	 the	 concept	 of	 war	 comparable	 to	 the	 one	 caused	 by	 the	 ‘military	revolution’,	which,	 as	 documented	 by	 the	 studies	 of	 Geoffrey	 Parker	 and	 Jeremy	Black,	 and	Michael	Roberts	before	 them,	 inaugurated	 the	modern	era.	Undoubtedly,	 today	we	are	only	seeing	the	first	signs,	the	experimental	phase	of	this	change,	as	we	are	reliving	the	very	same	situation	as	 late	medieval	men	 faced	 following	 the	development	of	 firearms	(Roberts,	1967;	Black,	1991;	Parker,	1996).4		The	 concept	 of	 ‘military	 revolution’	 goes	 beyond	 the	 purely	 war-related	 dimension;	 it	enables	 us	 to	 grasp	 the	 connection	 between	 the	 advent	 of	 new	 war	 technologies,	 the	




development	 of	 operational	 doctrines	 and	 social	 change	more	 in	 general.	 For	 example,	 the	spread	 of	 artillery,	 by	 forcing	 European	 cities	 to	 resort	 to	 bastioned	 fortifications,	 led	 to	 a	redesign	 of	 their	 urban	 layout	 (Lynn,	 1991):	 a	 process	 that	 had	 significant	 biopolitical	implications	 (Hirst,	 2005).	 Similarly,	 the	need	 to	deploy	 large	musket-equipped	 contingents	imposed	 the	 allocation	 of	 enormous	 economic	 resources,	 which	 were	 made	 available	 by	creating	state	bureaucracies	and	setting	up	a	particular	political	apparatus,	the	fiscal	State.5	At	the	same	time,	 the	spread	of	 infantries	equipped	with	 firearms	brought	about	a	progressive	decline	 in	 the	 role	 of	 cavalries,	which	 had	 dominated	 European	 battlefields	 throughout	 the	Middle	Ages.	This	process,	which	was	triggered	by	weapons	development,	paved	the	way	for	a	profound	social	transformation	and	contributed	to	the	rise	of	the	bourgeoisie.	So	what	will	be	the	 consequences	 of	 the	military	 revolution	 sparked	 by	 drones?	 Any	 answer	 is	 likely	 to	 be	largely	speculative,	but	what	we	may	be	certain	of	is	that	the	effects	of	the	acceleration	of	war	technology	will	not	be	limited	to	a	purely	military	dimension.		
Stealthy,	lethal,	autonomous	
	 What	are	we	talking	about	when	we	use	the	term	armed	drone	or,	more	correctly,	lethal	autonomous	 weapon?	 About	 a	 weapons	 system	 that	 is	 by	 now	 technologically	 well-established,	widely	disseminated	and	capable	of	operating	in	every	dimension:	today,	thanks	also	to	Hollywood,	armed	drones	have	taken	on	an	 iconic	value,	but	actual	military	arsenals	include	remotely	controlled	vehicles	capable	of	navigating	beneath	the	surface	of	 the	sea,	as	well	 as	 operating	 in	 the	 harshest	 land	 environments.6	 If,	 however,	 we	 limit	 our	 focus	 to	unmanned	aerial	vehicles	(UAVs),	it	seems	obvious	that	their	use,	despite	not	being	new,	has	undergone	a	brusque	acceleration:	as	early	as	 the	1930s	 these	aircraft	were	quite	common,	though	 used	 essentially	 as	 radio-controlled	 targets,	 i.e.	 basically	 for	 training	 purposes.	However,	 the	 next	 generation	 of	 UAVs	 displayed	 additional	 potentialities:	 during	 air	 raids	conducted	 by	 American	 forces	 against	 the	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 Vietnam,	 this	 type	 of	aircraft	 proved	 to	be	 valuable	 for	 reconnaissance	 activities	 in	 a	 highly	hostile	 environment.	UAVs	 were	 also	 used	 to	 confuse	 and	 saturate	 air	 defence	 systems:	 the	 Israeli	 Air	 Force	employed	 them	 successfully	 for	 this	 purpose	 in	 the	 Yom	 Kippur	 war.	 In	 the	 Kosovo	 war,	drones	already	took	on	a	more	offensive	role:	indeed,	U.S.	forces	made	wide	use	of	drones	to	identify	 targets	 which,	 after	 being	 ‘illuminated’	 by	 the	 laser	 designators	 the	 aircraft	 were	equipped	with,	were	attacked	with	other	weapons	systems	(Black,	2014,	pp.	54-81;	Bousquet,	2018).7		The	turning	point	came,	however,	in	the	aftermath	of	September	11th,	when	drones	went	from	 being	 ‘eyes’	 to	 being	 full-fledged	 offensive	 tools	 (Chamayou,	 2014,	 pp.	 26-27).	 8	 The	aircraft	 were	 equipped	 not	 only	 with	 airborne	 cameras	 or	 laser	 designators,	 but	 also	 with	highly	lethal	attack	weapons.	This	was	a	major	technological	development	which	took	hold	in	theatres	of	operation	with	impressive	speed,	comparable	to	the	advent	of	armoured	vehicles	on	battlefields	in	the	Second	World	War:	whereas	at	the	start	of	the	millennium	the	drones	in	the	 possession	 of	 U.S.	 armed	 forces	 still	 numbered	 only	 a	 few	 dozen,	 today	 the	 Pentagon’s	




arsenals	 include	 several	 thousand	 of	 these	 automated	 aircraft,	 to	which	we	may	 add	 –	 the	number	 is	unspecified	–	 the	ones	used	by	government	agencies	 like	 the	Central	 Intelligence	Agency	 (Braun,	 2015,	 pp.	 253-284)	 9	 or	 U.S.	 Customs	 &	 Border	 Protection	 (Nieto-Gomez,	2014,	 pp.	 191-210;	 M.	 C.	 Heatherly,	 2014,	 pp.	 25–37;	 R.	 Jones,	 C.	 Johnson,	 2016,	 pp.	 187-200).10	The	fact	that	only	a	rather	low	percentage	of	this	impressive	fleet	of	unmanned	aerial	vehicles	is	intended	for	attack	operations	–	actually	less	than	10	percent	–	is	simply	the	result	of	an	operational	choice	tied	to	geopolitical	scenarios.	In	any	case,	the	numerical	data	reveal	the	flexibility	of	this	technology,	which	may	prove	decisive	in	highly	differentiated	operational	scenarios.	A	 telling	 indication	 in	 this	regard	 is	 that	by	2014	the	United	States	Air	Force	was	already	 training	 more	 drone	 pilots	 than	 pilots	 for	 any	 other	 human-flown	 aircraft	 (The	Economist,	 2014).	 Yet	 we	 are	 just	 at	 the	 beginning:	 the	 Pentagon	 estimates	 that	 in	 2035	remotely	piloted	aircraft	will	make	up	 seventy	percent	of	USAF	aircraft.	But	 the	drone	 race	has	by	now	a	global	character,	so	much	so	that	analysts	expect	at	least	eighty	thousand	UAVs	and	two	thousand	attack	drones	to	be	produced	in	the	next	decade	(Sabbagh,	2019).		In	 fact,	 the	 Pentagon	 is	 not	 alone	 in	 being	 an	 enthusiastic	 advocate	 of	 this	 kind	 of	technology:	in	2005	about	forty	states	possessed	drones.	By	2012,	their	number	had	risen	to	seventy-six.	Today	 it	 is	believed	 that	more	 than	ninety	 states	have	remotely	piloted	aircraft	and	at	least	sixty-three	manufacture	them:	from	Syria	to	Pakistan,	from	Iran	to	North	Korea,	as	well	as	practically	every	NATO	member	(P.	L.	Bergen,	J.	Rowland,	2014,	pp.	300-341).	Nor	is	 it	only	states	which	possess	this	automated	technology:	Hezbollah	has	made	ample	use	of	Iranian-built	reconnaissance	drones	to	violate	Israeli	airspace,	and	it	has	shown	an	ability	to	conduct	complex	attack	operations	 in	Syria	(Hoenig,	2014;	Worrall,	Mabon,	Clubb,	2015,	pp.	61-62;	 Grossman,	 2018,	 pp.	 99-103).	 Teheran	 has	 provided	 Hamas	 with	 the	 technological	know-how	necessary	to	operate	UAVs,	and	Hamas	has	also	been	able	to	exploit	Israeli	drones	captured	in	Gaza	after	they	fell	to	the	ground	(Rossiter,	2018,	pp.	113-126).11	However,	it	has	been	 ISIS	 above	 all,	 which	 has	 demonstrated	 a	 considerable	 ability	 in	 the	 offensive	 use	 of	drones,	 obtained	 by	 successfully	 converting	 models	 found	 on	 the	 civilian	 market	 (Schulte,	2019,	pp.	416-433).		The	 ability	 of	 Ansar	 Allah	 to	 carry	 out	 attacks	 deep	 in	 the	 Arabian	 Peninsula	 in	 recent	months	 is	 emblematic	 of	 this	 trend.	 Using	 both	 refitted	 commercial	 models	 and	 aircraft	supplied	 by	 Iran,	 Shiite	militias	 have	 achieved	 a	 substantial	 number	 of	 military	 successes.	Alongside	 a	 tactical	 use	 in	 support	 of	 forces	 deployed	 on	 the	 ground,	 Ansar	 Allah	 has	employed	 these	 vehicles	 for	 long-range	 actions,	 striking	 targets	 beyond	 Yemeni	 borders:	between	the	spring	and	summer	of	2019,	several	major	Saudi	airport	infrastructures	were	the	target	 of	 coordinated	missile	 and	 drone	 attacks	 (Muhsin,	 2019).	 Last	 September,	 the	 heavy	damage	 caused	 to	 the	 Saudi	 Aramco	 Khurais	 oil	 installation	 and	 the	 processing	 facility	 in	Buqyaq,	 the	 largest	 in	 the	world,	 caused	widespread	 alarm	 in	 the	 international	 community	(Hubbard,	Karasz,	 Reed,	 2019).12	 The	 success	 achieved	by	 the	 armed	 Shiite	 group	 is	 all	 the	more	 significant	 if	 we	 consider	 that	 Saudi	 Arabia	 invests	 nearly	 nine	 percent	 of	 its	 GDP	 in	




military	 spending	 and	 today	 its	 air	 defence	 forces	 represent	 the	 state	 of	 the	 art	 in	 many	respects.	 Non-state	 actors	 such	 as	 private	 military	 and	 security	 companies	 (PMSCs)	complement	 the	 overall	 picture.	 It	 is	 a	 particularly	 opaque	 context,	 but	 there	 is	 no	 lack	 of	unexpected	glimpses	into	the	reality	which	suggest	alarming	scenarios,	such	as	the	report	of	the	purchase	by	an	unidentified	South	African	mining	company	of	about	 twenty	riot	control	drones	armed	with	non-lethal	weapons	(See	Smith,	2014).13		On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 dissemination	 of	 LAWs	 is	 justified	 by	 their	 relatively	 low	 cost	compared	to	conventional	aircraft,	their	sometimes	rather	simple	avionics	avionics,	and	above	all	 their	 versatility:	 in	 2017	 the	 Stockholm	 International	 Peace	 Research	 Institute	 already	counted	 381	 models	 of	 automated	 systems	 for	 military	 use,	 no	 fewer	 than	 175	 of	 which	endowed	with	offensive	capabilities	(Boulanin,	Verbruggen,	2017).	There	is	no	lack	of	variety:	the	arsenals	contain	drones	of	every	size,	from	rucksack-portable	drones	intended	for	tactical	use	to	aircraft	capable	of	remaining	airborne	for	over	thirty	hours	and	of	surveying,	with	their	highly	precise	sensors,	one	hundred	thousand	square	kilometres	of	territory	per	day.	Models	have	 been	 designed	which	 are	 capable	 of	 taking	 off	 from	 ship	 decks	 and	 even	 underwater	from	submarines.	In	addition	to	fixed	wing	drones,	rotary	wing	drones	are	widely	employed.	But	why	 limit	 ourselves	 to	 the	 third	dimension?	As	mentioned	 earlier,	military	 robots	have	undergone	 major	 development	 in	 terrestrial	 applications	 as	 well.	 Though	 the	 use	 of	 this	technology	was	 initially	 limited	 to	 dangerous	mine-clearing	 or	 explosive	 ordnance	 disposal	operations,	 the	 latest	 generation	 of	 these	 platforms	 features	 offensive	 weapons	 enabling	effective	engagement	with	the	enemy.	In	this	regard,	General	Robert	Cone,	former	head	of	the	United	 States	 Army	 Training	 and	 Doctrine	 Command	 (TRADOC),	 stated	 publicly	 that	 one	decade	from	now	at	least	a	quarter	of	land	forces	will	be	made	up	of	robots	(CBS	News,	2014).	Similar	developments	are	ongoing	in	the	naval	realm,	where	remote	control	mini	submarines	operate	alongside	unmanned	surface	vehicles;	 initially	used	 in	rescue	operations,	 they	were	later	 employed	 for	 minesweeping	 and,	 finally,	 for	 surveillance	 and	 intelligence	 activities	(Chadwick,	 2020,	 pp.	 132-156).	 The	 latest	 developments	 regard	 platforms	 capable	 of	operating	in	underground	environments,	particularly	useful	in	the	urban	settings	where	many	of	 the	 ongoing	 conflicts	 are	 taking	 place,	 whilst	 on	 the	 horizon	 we	 can	 see	 inventive	biomimetic	engineering	applications	aimed	at	the	creation	of	veritable	combat	androids.14	There	 is	 no	 point	 in	 venturing	 into	 areas	 of	 development	 which	 may	 today	 seem	 like	science	 fiction.	 It	 is	 certain,	 however,	 that	 the	 processes	 of	 digital	 technological	 innovation	will	 take	 these	 platforms	 to	 an	 extreme:	 we	 will	 have	 increasingly	 small,	 increasingly	 fast,	increasingly	 lethal	 automated	 systems.	Above	 all,	 their	 cognitive	 capabilities	will	 be	 further	increased	 and	 the	 remote	 presence	 of	 a	 human	 operator	will	 be	 increasingly	marginal:	 the	outcome	 of	 this	 technological	 development	 will	 be	 intelligent	 weapons	 systems	 capable	 of	selecting	targets	and	deciding	autonomously	whether	to	carry	through	with	an	attack,	as	was	reported	by	the	United	Nations	Institute	for	Disarmament	Research	(UNIDIR).15	
	





Towards	post-human	war		 What	 significance	 should	 we	 attribute	 to	 the	 military	 revolution	 triggered	 by	 drone	warfare?	How	should	we	interpret	this	powerful	unleashing	of	technology?	To	Carl	Schmitt’s	readers,	what	is	happening	is	only	the	conclusion	of	a	process	that	began	in	the	last	century	with	the	advent	of	air	warfare	and	set	off	a	wholly	new	Raumrevolution	in	the	sign	of	fire,	or	rather,	of	technology	(Schmitt,	1942).16	The	fact	that,	precisely	when	Land	und	Meer	was	going	to	 print,	 Schmitt	 had	 direct	 experience	 of	 the	 first	 bombing	 raids	 on	 Berlin,	 make	 his	considerations	particularly	insightful,	where	drone	warfare	may	be	viewed	as	a	sublimation	of	air	 warfare.17	 In	 fact,	 the	 concept	 of	 enmity	 is	 analogous	 in	 a	 situation	 in	 which	 the	 hostis	becomes	just	a	target,	is	a	signal	on	a	display	that	must	be	deactivated.	Where	the	distinction	between	civil	and	military	ends	up	being	blurred.	Where	there	 is	no	 longer	any	relationship	between	 the	 power	 exerting	 force	 and	 the	 territorial	 space	 onto	 which	 that	 force	 is	projected.18		Perhaps,	 however,	 even	 this	 reference	 to	 air	 power	 is	 ultimately	 obsolete	 and	 hence	fundamentally	misleading	 if	 one	 interprets	 the	 advent	 of	 unmanned	 combat	 aerial	 vehicles	(UCAVs)	as	a	sign	of	 further	accelerations	of	military	 technology.	We	may	therefore	wonder	whether	 the	entry	of	LAWs	 into	war	 scenarios	prefigures	 forms	of	post-human	conflict	 that	will	 force	us	 to	 rethink	 the	very	notion	of	 enmity	and,	ultimately,	 to	 establish	a	new	nomos	(Amato	Mangiameli,	2012,	pp.	197-213).	Caution	brings	us	to	a	halt	before	the	opening	up	of	such	problems.	Though	the	prognosis	may	be	extraordinarily	complex,	we	must	nonetheless	look	into	one	of	the	crucial	factors	of	the	diagnosis,	namely,	the	intrinsically	nihilistic	nature	of	autonomous	weapons	systems.	The	drone	is	the	main	driver	of	this	process,	which	involves	a	technological	as	well	as	an	ethical	and	legal	dimension.	Much	more	effective	than	conventional	aircraft	 and	 more	 lethal	 than	 satellites,	 remotely	 piloted	 aircraft	 embody	 the	 ideal	 of	 air	power,	vertical	and	immune	from	all	physical	restraints:	State	territory	is	thus	neutralised	and	reduced	to	a	uniform	field	of	observation	subject	to	sudden	lethal	projections	of	violence.	In	this	 context,	 drones	 give	 an	 exceptional	 intensity	 to	 the	 phrase	 global	 war	 on	 terror,	 by	celebrating	 the	 advent	 of	 an	 all-seeing,	 tireless	 power,	 which	 above	 all	 has	 practically	unlimited	 capabilities.	 Whereby	 the	 eye	 can	 shift	 into	 a	 weapon	 and	 conduct	 attacks	 at	lightning	 speed.	 The	 paradigm	 of	 this	 ethereal	 panopticon,	 as	 Gregoire	 Chamayou	provocatively	wrote	in	his	brilliant	Théorie	du	drone,	is	no	longer	to	oversee	and	punish,	but	to	oversee	and	annihilate	(Chamayou,	2015,	p.	43).	By	 virtue	 of	 this	 ‘vertical’	 power,	 however,	 not	 only	 the	 individual	 but	 also	 the	 very	sovereignty	of	states	is	compressed,	annihilated.	There	are	heavy	consequences:	reports	such	as	 the	 one	 from	 the	 Stanford	 International	 Human	 Rights	 and	 Conflict	 Resolution	 Clinic,	published	back	in	2012,	have	highlighted	the	tragic	effects	of	American	UCAVs’	activity	on	the	people	of	West	Pakistan	(Cavallaro,	Sonnenberg	Knuckey,	2012).19	The	constant	exposure	to	




drone	surveillance	and	 the	 risk	of	a	 sudden,	unpredictable	attack	has	 led	 to	a	perception	of	vulnerability	among	 the	 inhabitants.	This	has	had	severe	negative	psychological	effects.	The	condition	of	being	perpetually	subject	to	the	risk	of	a	strike	has	gone	hand	in	hand	with	the	awareness	of	the	state’s	inability	to	offer	adequate	protection:	a	twofold	awareness	bound	to	have	 profound	 repercussions,	 ultimately	 calling	 into	 question	 the	 notion	 of	 protectio	 et	
oboedientia	which,	since	Hobbes	(1651,	II,	xxi),	has	been	the	cornerstone	of	state	sovereignty	(Chamayou,	2015,	pp.	177-184).20	And	it	is	worth	asking	ourselves	whether	this	effect	is	not	simply	a	collateral	damage	of	drone	warfare,	but	rather	a	carefully	pursued	objective.	In	other	words,	 the	use	of	drones	 is	 consistent	with	 the	most	well-established	 theories	of	air	power,	from	Giulio	Douhet’s	groundbreaking	 theories	on	 the	mass	use	of	air	weapons	 to	 the	 terror	bombing	 widely	 employed	 in	 the	 last	 world	 war,	 to	 the	 Cold	 War	 theories	 of	 strategic	bombing	(See	Douhet,	1921).21	Yet,	drone	war,	because	of	its	intensity	and	ubiquitous	nature,	represents	 a	departure	 that	makes	 it	 incommensurable	with	 the	previous	manifestations	of	air	power.	The	nihilism	 triggered	by	 the	drone	 revolution	 also	 affects	 the	 legal	notion	of	war	 as	 it	evolved	starting	from	the	jus	publicum	europaeum,	and	which,	notwithstanding	all	the	ensuing	developments	 and	 interruptions,	 has	 moulded	 contemporary	 international	 law	 too	(Chamayou,	2015,	pp.	158-166).	Underlying	this	idea	of	war	is	the	metaphor	expressed	in	De	
jure	 belli	 by	 Alberico	 Gentili,	 who	 described	 warring	 parties	 as	 duellists,	 formally	 equal,	bearing	 the	 same	 obligations	 and	 endowed	with	 identical	 prerogatives.22	 According	 to	 this	way	of	thinking,	the	logical	premise	of	war,	as	a	legally	relevant	fact,	is	the	circumstance	that	both	contenders	have	the	option	of	using	force.	The	fathers	of	international	law	founded	the	legitimacy	of	war	precisely	on	this	symmetry:	in	the	third	book	of	De	iure	belli	ac	pacis,	when	Grotius	 (1625)	 highlighted	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 ius	 gentium	 prohibited	 the	 use	 of	 poison	 and	assassination,	 he	 was	 motivated	 by	 the	 need	 to	 safeguard	 this	 balance,	 rather	 than	 by	humanitarian	 concerns.23	 However,	 the	 appearance	 of	 drone	 technology	 breaks	 down	 this	symmetrical	 relationship:	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 duel	 is	 definitively	 contradicted	 when	 machines	replace	men	and	violence	becomes	unilateral.	Certainly,	one	might	argue	that	a	drone	could	be	shot	 down,	 but	 that	 is	 hardly	 a	 decisive	 consideration	 given	 that	 this	 weapons	 system	channels	 violence	 in	 a	 single	 direction,	 while	 the	 operator	 controlling	 it	 is	 thousands	 of	kilometres	away.	A	remotely	piloted	aircraft	thus	becomes	a	hypertechnological	bloodhound	that	 tirelessly	 pursues	 its	 prey	 and,	 with	 lethal	 violence,	 kills	 it.	 As	 observed	 again	 by	Chamayou,	the	war	paradigm	is	replaced	by	another:	that	of	a	hunt	(Chamayou,	2015,	pp.	52-59).	But	the	extreme	degree	of	nihilism	is	reached	when	war	becomes	governed	exclusively	by	algorithms	 and	 cybernetic	 systems.	 As	 we	 are	 reminded	 by	 the	 opening	 frames	 of	 Stanley	Kubrick’s	 masterpiece	 2001:	 A	 Space	 Odyssey,	 accompanied	 by	 the	 powerful	 Also	 Sprach	
Zarathustra	by	Strauss	–	the	famous	scene	of	a	hominid	learning	to	use	a	bone	as	a	weapon	–	technology	has	played	an	instrumental	role	in	war,	where	a	triple	objective	is	pursued:	to	pre-empt	 an	 attack,	 to	 cause	 as	 much	 damage	 as	 possible	 and	 to	 strike	 without	 risking	 any	




response	from	the	adversary.	In	this	sense,	robot	technology	has	simply	brought	a	long-lasting	process	to	an	extreme:	 in	his	 iconic	study	on	the	origins	of	medieval	cavalry,	Franco	Cardini	highlighted	that	a	mounted	combatant	already	represented	an	archetypical	 figure	where	the	synthesis	 between	 equestrian	 skill	 and	 art	 de	 la	 guerre	 shaped	 a	 different	 anthropology	(Cardini,	 2014).	The	 introduction	of	 increasingly	 sophisticated	and	 lethal	weapons	has	now	caused	 a	 more	 and	 more	 marked	 compression	 of	 the	 human	 factor,	 if	 not	 the	 erasure	 of	human	race	in	the	case	of	nuclear	weapons.24	The	advent	of	LAWs,	therefore,	is	essentially	the	apotheosis	of	this	historical	process:	automated	weapons	systems	enable	something	that	was	once	 unthinkable:	 the	 possibility	 of	 engaging	 in	 combat	 without	 suffering	 human	 loss.	 But	when	 this	 objective	 is	 reached,	 the	 last	 threshold	will	 be	 definitively	 crossed	 and	war	will	inevitably	 take	 on	 a	 post-human	 feature:25	 while	 sentient	 machines	 dominate	 battlefields,	enemies	 will	 suffer	 a	 definitive	 degradation,	 an	 extreme	 dehumanisation	 reducing	 them	 to	mere	electronic	pulses	on	a	computer	terminal.		
Conclusions	
	What	 is	 left	 of	 the	 noble	 institutes	 of	 humanitarian	 law	 once	 robotic	 technology	 takes	over?	 Consider	 the	 rules	 of	 occupatio	 bellica	 as	 provided	 for	 by	 articles	 42-56	 of	 the	Regulations	annexed	to	the	IV	Hague	Convention	of	1907	and	subsequently	by	the	IV	Geneva	Convention	of	1949:	They	set	up	a	range	of	guarantees	for	the	people	of	occupied	territories	and,	at	the	same	time,	impose	a	number	of	obligations	on	occupiers.	Now,	as	the	19th	century	doctrine	had	already	pointed	out,	the	occupiers’	imperium	is	based	exclusively	on	their	actual	control	of	the	occupied	territory.	In	other	words,	for	occupation	to	have	legal	consequences,	it	had	 to	 be	 effective	 (Mannoni,	 1999,	 165-167).	 Drone	 war,	 as	 we	 have	 seen,	 deprives	 the	spatial	 dimension	 of	 any	 legal	 significance:	 the	 territory	 is	 neutralised,	 turning	 into	 an	unbounded	battlefield.	In	the	light	of	what	Grégoire	Chamayou	observed,	the	very	concept	of	occupying	power	becomes	meaningless:	“It	now	becomes	a	matter	not	so	much	of	occupying	a	territory	 as	 of	 controlling	 it	 from	 above	 by	 ensuring	 its	 mastery	 of	 the	 skies”	 (Chamayou,	2015,	53).	A	mastery	which,	in	the	light	of	the	Pakistani	events,	can	quickly	turn	into	a	deadly	attack.	Or	what	 is	 left	 of	 the	 fundamental	 distinction	between	 civilian	 and	 combatant,	 the	 true	cornerstone	 of	 humanitarian	 law?	Western	military	 ethics	 first,	 and	 then	 international	 law,	based	 the	 humanisation	 of	 war	 on	 this	 differentiation.	 Suffice	 it	 to	 recall	 the	 medieval	distinction	 between	 oratores,	 bellatores	 and	 laboratores,	 or	 Augustine’s	 notion	 of	 bellum	
iustum	 and	 the	 concept	 of	 debitus	modus	 in	 the	 use	 of	 force,	 or	what	 Bernard	 of	 Clairvaux	writes	about	the	dichotomy	between	militia	and	malitia	 in	the	use	of	weapons.	These	are	all	principles	 that,	 through	 a	 long	 process,	 have	 become	 customary	 in	 the	 international	 legal	order	 (Manzin,	 2016).	 Already	 in	 1880,	 the	 famous	manual	 on	 the	 Laws	 of	War	 on	 Land	 –	better	known	as	the	Oxford	Manual,	being	the	result	of	the	generous	efforts	of	the	Institut	de	
droit	 international	 –,	 had	 expressly	 provided	 in	 Art.	 7	 that	 “It	 is	 forbidden	 to	 maltreat	inoffensive	 populations”.	 Now,	 practices	 such	 as	 the	 signature	 strike	 adopted	 in	 the	employment	 of	 UCAVs,	 seriously	 risk	 undermining	 this	 articulated	 apparatus	 of	




temperamenta	belli,	when	 the	distinction	between	civilian	and	military	 is	 the	outcome	of	an	algorithm.		What	 is	 left,	 finally,	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 humanity,	 which	 is	 the	 axiological	 basis	 of	International	 Humanitarian	 Law?	 Faced	 with	 a	 machine	 designed	 to	 kill	 the	 safeguards	provided	 by	 the	 First	 Geneva	 Convention	 for	 the	 Amelioration	 of	 the	 Condition	 of	 the	Wounded	and	Sick	in	Armed	Forces	in	the	Field	and	the	Third	Geneva	Convention	relative	to	the	 Treatment	 of	 Prisoners	 of	War	 simply	 no	 longer	 have	 any	 point.	 They	 refer	 to	 a	 status	which	is	simply	not	compatible	with	the	use	of	UCAVs.	That	destructive	practice	so	widespread	among	humankind	that	we	call	war	 is	the	most	thorough	 manifestation	 of	 intraspecific	 violence.	 As	 ethologists	 suggest,	 among	 superior	animals,	and	even	more	so	among	primates,	the	killing	of	one’s	own	kind	is	an	extremely	rare	event,	all	the	more	so	at	group	level.	There	are	in	fact	a	whole	range	of	inhibitory	mechanisms	that	prevent	violence	 from	going	as	 far	as	 the	suppression	of	 the	possible	antagonist.	Homo	
sapiens,	instead,	is	an	absolutely	remarkable	exception.	This	is	because	it	is	able	to	activate	a	whole	 range	of	 cultural	devices	whose	 final	 result	 is	 the	 so-called	 ‘pseudospeciation’:	 at	 the	end	of	this	process,	members	of	the	antagonist	group	are	effectively	perceived	as	belonging	to	a	different	species	and,	therefore,	can	be	suppressed	without	any	inhibitory	mechanism	being	activated.	The	pseudospeciation	process	is	not	automatic:	the	threshold	for	the	use	of	violence	remains	 high.	 A	 series	 of	 complex	 practices	 are	 needed	 to	 release	 the	 brakes	 that	 inhibit	intraspecific	 killing.	 In	 so-called	 traditional	 societies	 this	 ceremonial	 was	 linked	 to	 ritual	practices	 of	 a	 magical-religious	 character,	 whereas	 today	 it	 is	 based	 on	 diplomatic	 and	normative	protocols,	but	also	on	the	crucial	contribution	of	the	media	(Zolo,	1995,	147-150).	With	 the	 rise	 of	 robotic	 technology,	 the	 situation	 is	 bound	 to	 change	 radically:	 the	moment	 the	 machine	 takes	 the	 place	 of	 man,	 any	 mechanism	 capable	 of	 inhibiting	 war	violence	 will	 simply	 evaporate.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 advent	 of	 combat	 automatons,	 already	anticipated	 by	 the	 spread	 of	 LAWs,	 will	 bring	 about	 a	 drastic	 lowering	 of	 the	 threshold	 of	violence,	where	killing	will	simply	be	the	result	of	an	impulse	in	a	cybernetic	system.		
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